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Abstract 
We investigate how large is the social benefit (or cost) of the stock price bubble 
formulated by Olivier (2000). We consider three types of the bubble: continuous 
non-self-fulfilling bubble (CNB), and temporal non-self-fulfilling bubble (TNB), and 
self-fulfilling bubble (SB). Under the condition that utilities of all generations are 
evaluated almost equally we show that (ⅰ) the existence of CNB improves the social 
welfare and its extent is equilvalent to subsidizing 00 /)( gggB − (>0) rate of a wage 
income to all generations in the bubbleless economy (where 0g and Bg are the 
growth rate of the economy without bubble and with bubble, respectively), (ⅱ) the 
welfare property of TNB is neutral in that the social welfare level of the economy with 
TNB is exactly equal to that of the bubbleless economy, and (ⅲ) the existence of SB 
harms the social welfare and its extent is equilvalent to imposing 00 /)( ggg B− (>0) 
rate of a wage income tax to all generations.   
Key Word: Stock Price Bubble, Endogenous Growth, Variety Expansion, Overlapping 
Generations 
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1.  Introduction 
 The effects of an asset price bubble on the economy have been argued actively in the 
context of macroeconomics. The research in the 1980’s as typified by Wallace (1980), 
Tirole (1985) and O’Connell and Zeldes (1988) showed that in the standard neoclassical 
OG economy an intrinsically worthless asset like a paper money can have the positive 
value in equilibrium and the existence of such a “pure bubble” can improve the welfare 
of the economy in the Pareto’s sence when the economy without it is dynamically 
inefficient2. In the 1990’s Grossman and Yanagawa (1993), King (1992), King and 
 
1 Email: j-tanaka@kitakyu-u.ac.jp 
2 Recently, Caballero et al. (2006) reconsidered the properties of a pure bubble by using 
an OG model with a “growth-funding feedback mechanism”. They showed that in such a 
specific framework a pure bubble can exist in equilibrium even if the interest rate is 
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Ferguson (1993) and Futagami and Shibata (1999, 2000) reexamined this issue in the 
context of endogenous growth theory and demonstrated that under such a framework a 
pure bubble can exist in equilibrium even if the economy without bubble is not 
dynamically inefficient, and it generally harms the welfare of future generations 
because it impedes growth. In all these pieces of research the subject of the analysis is a 
pure bubble, but more recently Olivier (2000) considered a bubble which arises on the 
stock prices of firms which are newly created by the R&D activity and investigate the 
economic implications of such a bubble by using an endogenously growing continuous 
OG model with an expanding variety of final goods 3. 
  In this context, however, the question of how large is the social benefit (or cost) of such 
bubbles has not been considered sufficiently. Regarding the social cost of a pure bubble, 
Tanaka (2007) studied the question based on the Grossman and Yaganawa (1993) model, 
and showed that if the utilities of all generations are evaluated almost equally the social 
cost of a pure bubble in an endogenous growth model is equivalent to imposing a wage 
income tax whose rate is SB / , where B  is the real value of bubbly asset and S  is 
the total savings. To my knowledge, however, there is no attempt to examine the social 
cost (or benefit) of a stock price bubble, although in an actual economy a bubble usually 
arises not on an intrinsically worthless asset but on productive assets like stocks and 
lands. We therefore explore the social welfare effect of the stock price bubble formulated 
by Olivier (2000) by using the model of Tanaka (2008) which is a simplified version of 
Olivier’s original model4.  
  In this paper we consider the following three types of the stock price bubble: 
self-fulfilling bubble (SB), continuous non-self-fulfilling bubble (CNB), and temporal 
non-self-fulfilling bubble (TNB). SB, which is the standard formalizaiton of bubble in 
this context, continues to grow at the same speed as the growth rate of the economy 
along the equilibrium path, so the expectation of any generation about the next period’s 
market value of it is never betrayed in such a case. On the other hand, CNB and TNB 
are assumed to collapse unexpectedly in the next period, so they are common in that 
they do not have the self-fulfilling property, but they differs in that the former arises at 
every period while the latter does only at one period, say, the initial period. Then we 
particularly explore the effects of the existence of such types of bubble on social welfare, 
                                                                                                                                                   
higher than the growth rate, and also that investment and the bubble grow in tandem. 
3 Another somewhat similar research is that of Ventura (2003), who constructs a simple 
model where entrepreneurs can create bubbly firms which are bought by shareholders 
for the purpose of saving, and shows that the creation of bubbly firms can stimulate 
capital accumulation when the financial market is imperfect. 
4 Tanaka (2008) differs from Olivier (2008) in that it is a discrete-time model and the 







and demonstrate that their effects on social welfare are quite different depending on the 
type. In the next section we consider the growth and welfare effects of non-self-fulfilling 
bubbles (CNB and TNB), and especially show that the existence of CNB improves the 
social welfare and its extent is equilvalent to subsidizing 00 /)( gggB −  (>0) rate of a 
wage income to all generations in the bubbleless economy (where 0g  and Bg  are the 
growth rate of the economy without bubble and with bubble, respectively), while the 
welfare property of TNB is neutral in that the social welfare level of the economy with 
TNB is exactly equal to that of the bubbleless economy. In section 3 we investigate the 
social welfare effect of SB, and demonstrate that the existence of SB harms the social 
welfare and its extent is equilvalent to imposing 00 /)( ggg B−  (>0) rate of a wage 
income tax to all generations. Finally, we conclude the paper in section 4. 
 
 
2.  The case of non-self-fulfilling bubbles 
  We analyze the social welfare effects of the stock price bubble based on a framework of 
Tanaka (2008) which introduces Olivier (2000)’s formulation of bubble into an 
endogenous growth model with the expanding variety of intermediate goods described 
in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004, ch6). In this section the growth and welfare effects of 
non-self-fulfilling bubbles are examined. The analysis of self-fulfilling bubble will be 
done in the next section. 
 
2.1  The Production Sector 
  We assume an economy with three production sectors (a final goods sector, an 
intermediate goods sector, and an R&D sector).  
The final goods sector 
  In this sector, unique final goods are produced by many identical firms that behave 
competitively. The number of such firms is normalized to one without any loss of 
generality. Final goods can be used for consumption, as input to the intermediate goods 
sector, and as input to the R&D sector. The production function of the representative 
firm is 









)( α , 
where A , tL , 
j
tx  and tN  are the productivity, the labor input, the input of the j th 
type of intermediate goods, and the number of varieties available at period t , 





representative firm is 



















where tw  is the wage rate and 
j
tp  is the price of the j th type of intermediate goods. 
The profit maximization behavior of the firm yields the following FOCs. 
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From the second equation of (3) we can obtain the representative firm’s demand 
function for the j th type of intermediate goods as 















tL . （ ],1[ tNj∈∀ ） 
The intermediate goods sector 
There are tN  types of intermediate goods at the beginning of period t  and this 
number grows over time through the activity of the R&D sector formalized below. The 
j th type of intermediate goods are produced by firm j  which has permanent 
monopoly rights over their production and sale. We assume each unit of intermediate 
goods costs one unit of final goods to produce. So the profit of firm j  at period t  is 




t xp )1( − . 
Firm j  sets the price jtp  to maximize the profit (5) subject to the demand constraint 
(4), so the optimal price is  
(6)     jtp ＝ p＝ α/1  
which shows that the price of each of the intermediate goods is constant over time and 
equal across type. From (6) we have: 
(7)     jtx ＝ tx ,  
j
























＋…)＝ tQ , 
where jtQ  is the fundamental value of firm j ’s stock price and tr  is the interest rate. 
  Finally, we can derive the following: 







(8)     tY ＝ tt Lw ＋ tt Npx . 
・From (1), (3), (4) and (7), we have 
(9)     tw tL ＝ )1( α−
αααα −− 1/21/1A tN tL (＝ tY)1( α− ). 
The R&D sector 
An expansion in the variety of intermediate goods requires purposive effort in the 
form of R&D activity. We suppose that the cost of creating a new type of intermediate 
goods is fixed at η  in terms of the final goods, and that if an inventor succeeds in 
creating a new type of goods in period t  they can sell it from the next period. Since we 
have assumed that an inventor can obtain permanent monopoly rights over the 
production and the sale of a newly invented type of intermediate goods, the discounted 
fundamental value of the benefit from the R&D activity in period t  is given by 
)1/( 11 ++ + tt rQ . In this paper, however, we consider the situation in which all inventors 
overestimate the value of a newly created firm founded in the next period. Specifically, 
we assume that in period t  all inventors expect the value of a newly created firm to be 
1+tQ ＋ )1,1( ++ ttB . Here, ),( tsB  is defined as a bubble which arises in period t  on 
the firm founded in period s  ( ts ≤ ), so the above )1,1( ++ ttB  is a bubble which 
arises in period 1+t  on the stock price of the firm just founded in period 1+t . 
Therefore, in the case where a bubble exists, the discounted estimated value of 
successful R&D activity is [ 1+tQ ＋ )1,1( ++ ttB ] )1/( 1++ tr . For analytical simplicity we 
assume that: 







＝B   (constant). 
We call this B  “the initial bubble” hereafter. Under free entry to the R&D sector the 
following condition must hold in equilibrium: 










In this section we consider a situation where a bubble does not actually arise in the next 
period. Namely, we consider the case where the actual market value of the newly 
created firms at period 1+t  is 1+tQ  although at period t  the inventor in the R&D 
sector estimates the value of them to be 1+tQ ＋ )1,1( ++ ttB . In this sense the bubble 
examined in this section does not have the self-fulfilling property. The case of the 
self-fulfilling bubble is investigated in the next section. 
 
2.2  The Household  





households. It is assumed that there is one old household and one young household 
during any period, so the total number of households is two and is constant over time. 
Each generation, which lives for two periods (young and old), is endowed with a 
constant L  units of labor when young and supplies this labor inelastically to the 
producers of final goods. After receiving their wage income they allocate it to young 
period consumption and to savings so as to maximize the lifetime utility. The problem 
for generation t  (the young household in period t ) is formulated as 




tc 1log +β     s.t.  
y
tc ＋ ts ＝ Lwt ,  
o
tc 1+ ＝ tt sr )1( 1++ , 
where ytc , 
o
tc 1+ , ts  and β ( 10 << β ) are the young period consumption, the old 
period consumption, savings, and the discount factor, respectively. Here, note that the 
return rate of the savings ( 1+tr ) is the “expected” return rate by young household, and 
the actual (or expost) return rate of it is lower than the expected one because the bubble 
considered in this section does not have the self-fulfilling property. The optimal plans 
for consumption and savings are  
(13)     ytc ＝ β+1
1 Lwt ,  
o
tc 1+ ＝ )1( 1++ tr β
β
+1




On the other hand, generation 1−t  (the old household in period t ), which is the owner 
of the whole wealth of the economy at the beginning of period t , is assumed to sell it to 
generation t  and to spend all the revenue on consumption. Since the bubble considered 
in this section does not arise actually, the behavior of generation 1−t  is given by 
(14)     otc ＝ tt NQ  
where otc  is the old period consumption of generation 1−t .  
 
2.4  The Market Equilibrium  
  In our model there are three markets (the labor market, the final goods market, and 
the intermediate goods market), but the market for intermediate goods is always 
clearing because each producer of intermediate goods produces goods of a quantity 
equal to the demand constraint (4), so it is only necessary to discuss the equilibrium 
conditions of the labor market and the final goods market. Firstly, the equilibrium 
condition of the labor market is  







from which we have the following5: 
(16)   tx ＝ x , tπ ＝π , tr ＝ r ,  tQ ＝Q（＝π ＋ r/π ）,  tY ＝ Lwt ＋ tpxN . 
Furthermore, under tr ＝ r  and tπ ＝π  the equilibrium condition in the R&D sector 
(11) can be rewritten as 
(17)    r/π ＝η－B . 
Secondly, the equilibrium condition of the final goods market is  




t cc + ＋ txN ＋ )( 1 tt NN −+η . 
After some calculation this can be transformed as follows6: 
(19)   ts ＝ 1+tNη － tBN , 
On the other hand, from (9), (13) and (15) the young household’s savings is 
(20)   ts ＝ β
β
+1
Lwt ＝ tNφ  （ ≡φ β
β
+1
)1( α− αααα −− 1/21/1A L） 
So, from (19) and (20) the gross growth rate of this economy is calculated as 
(21)   Bg （≡ tt NN /1+ ）＝ η
φ B+
  
We can confirm from this that the economy always stays in the balanced grwoth path 
and the growth rate of the economy is higher as the size of the initial bubble ( B ) is 
larger. In this sense this type of bubble can be called as the growth-enhancing bubble as 
was named by Olivier (2000). If the bubble does not exist (that is, 0=B ), the growth 
rate of the economy ( 0g ) is  
(22)   0g ＝ ηφ /  
In this paper we assume 0g ＝ ηφ / ＞1 (namely, the net growth rate of the bubbleless 
economy is positive). 
                                                   
5 Here, tr ＝ r  can be derived from (11): )1/( 1++ trQ ＋B＝η . The proof is available 
upon request. 
6 The derivation of (19) is as follows. 




t cc + ＋ txN ＋ )( 1 tt NN −+η  
  ⇔  Lwt ＋ tpxN ＝
y
tc ＋ tt NQ ＋ txN ＋ )( 1 tt NN −+η   (by (16) and (51)) 
  ⇔  Lwt －
y
tc ＝ tt NQ ＋ txNp )1( − ＋ )( 1 tt NN −+η  
  ⇔  ts ＝ tNQ )( π− ＋ )( 1 tt NN −+η   (by (12) and (5)) 







2.4  Welfare effects of the continuous non-self-fulfilling bubble (CNB) 
  In this subsection we consider the economy where the non-self-fulfilling bubble arises 
at every period. In other words, we consider the case where the equilibrium condition in 
the R&D sector is given by (11) in every periods, but such an initial bubble never 
realizes in the next period. We call this type of bubble the “continuous non-self-fulfilling 
bubble” (CNB). 
  In order to examine the welfare implication of the CNS, we first derive the welfare 
index (or the indirect utility function) of each generation. From (14), (16) and (17) the 
welfare index of generation 1−t  in period t  is  
(23)   1−tU ＝
y
tclogβ ＝ tt NQlogβ  
＝ tNB)log( −+ηπβ  
From (13), (20) and (21), the welfare index of generation t  can be derived as 












1log ＋ 11log ++ tt NQβ  
＝ )log( tNβ
φ
＋ ])log[( tB NgB−+ηπβ  
Finally, from (13), (20) and (21), we can calculate the welfare index of generation st +  
( 1≥s ) as  
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2.4.1  Intergenerational effect of an unexpected permanent change in the CNB 
  We first investigate how an unexpected permanent increase in the CNB at the 
beginning of period t  affects the welfare of each generation.  
  Firstly, as is clear from (23), an unexpected permanent increase in the initial bubble 
( B ) harms the welfare of genaration 1−t . This is because such a change raises the 
return rate from the R&D activity (see (11)), which lowers the market value of the total 
wealth ( tt NQ ) held by generation 1−t .   
  Secondly, its effect on generation t ’s welfare is ambiguous. This is because the effect 
of an increase in B  on the market value of the total wealth at period 1+t  (namely, 
11 ++ tt NQ ) is obscure. As was stated above, such a change lowers the stock price at period 







increase in B , on the other hand, also lowers the stock price at period t  ( tQ ), and this 
increases the part of young household’s savings allocated to the R&D activity, which 
accelerates growth and brings about the larger 1+tN . Since an increase in B  has these 
opposing effects on 11 ++ tt NQ , its welfare effect is indeterminate.  
  Finally, the effect of an increase in B  on the welfare of generation st +  is also 
basically ambiguous by the similar reason as that of generation t , but such a change 
can improve the welfare of the future generations born sufficiently later. An increase in 
B  raises the future wage income received by future generations through stimulating 
growth, and this improves the welfare of all the future generation. On the other hand, 
its effect on the asset value ( 11 ++++ stst NQ ) is basically obscure by the same reason before, 
but this second effect also has the positive impact on the welfare of the generations who 
are born after a sufficient delay, because such generations have sufficiently large 1++stN  
though an acceleration of growth.   
  Remarkably, these results regarding the intergenerational welfare effect of a stock 
price bubble is in stark contrast to those of a pure bubble (namely, a bubble on an 
intrinsically worthless asset like fiat money) argued by Grossman and Yanagawa (1993). 
As was shown by them, the existence of a pure bubble improves the welfare of the 
current old (corresponding to generation 1−t  in this paper), keeps unchanged the 
welfare of the current young (corresponding to generation t ), and harms the welfare of 
future generations (corresponding to generation st + ). This difference stems from the 
fact that a stock price bubble considered in this section promotes growth through 
stimulating the R&D activity while a pure bubble depresses growth because its 
existence crowds out capital.    
 
2.4.2  Social welfare effect of the CNB 
  In this subsection we try to measure how large is the effect of the existence of the 
CNB on social welfare by assuming the following linear socail welfare function: 




tUδ ＋ tU ＋ 1+tUδ ＋ 2
2
+tUδ … （ 10 << δ ） 
Substituting (23), (24) and (25) into (26), we can derive the social welfare level of the 
economy with the CNS as  
(27)   btW ＝ )1( δδ
β
−








In order to measure how large the social benefit (or cost) of the CNB is, we consider the 
“benchmark” bubbleless economy where the wage income tax whose rate is τ  is 





an economy differs from the economy with the CNB in the followings: 
・Since the bubble does not arise in the benchmark economy, the equilibrium condition 














・Since the wage income tax is imposed to all generations in the benchmark economy, the 
utility maximization problem of the household is reformulated as 
(29)  Max tU   s.t. 
y
tc ＋ ts ＝ )1( τ− Lwt , 
o
tc 1+ ＝ tt sr )1( 1++  
So, the optimal plans for consumptions and savings are 
(30)  ytc ＝ )1( τ− β+1




・Since 0=B  holds in the benchmark economy, the equilibrium condition of the final 
goods market (19) can be rewritten as 
(31)  ts ＝ 1+tNη  
Accordingly, from (20), (30), and (31) the growth rate of the benchmark economy can be 
derived as  
(32)  τg （≡ tt NN /1+ ）＝ η
φτ )1( −  
Calculating the social welfare level of this economy by the same way as the previous 
subsection, we have 
(33)  τtW ＝ )1( δδ
β
−
])log[( tNηπ + ＋ δ−1
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⎡ + 1B  
This result means that the existence of the CNB produces the social benefit (or cost) 
which is equivalent to imposing the wage income tax rate given by (34) to all 
generations in the bubbleless economy, and that the existence of the CNB brings the 
social cost (resp. benefit) if τ  in (34) is positive (resp. negative). 





evaluated almost equally. In such a case, τ  in (34) can be calculated as 
(35)  τ ≒－ φ/B  
Using (21), (35) can be rewritten as 







gg B−  
Accordingly, if we have Bg ＝1.1 and 0g ＝1.05, the existence of the CNB creates the 
social benefit which is equivalent to guarantee a subsidy equal to about 4.8% of the 
wage income to all generations. To summarize, we have 
 
Proposition 1: If the utilities of all generations are evaluated almost equally, the 
existence of the CNB creates the social benefit which is equivalent to guaranteeing to 
all generations a wage income subsidy whose rate is 00 /)( ggg B− . 
 
2.4  Welfare effects of the temporal non-self-fulfilling bubble (TNB) 
  In the previous subsection we considered a type of the bubble which arises at every 
period despite the fact that it never realizes at the next period. However, it seems to be 
unnatural to assume that a bubble arises at every period which never realizes. In this 
subsection we therefore consider the non-self-fulfilling bubble which arises only at 
period t  (namely, the initial period of the economy) and does not appear after period t . 
We call such a bubble the “temporal non-self-fulfilling bubble” (TNB). 
  Since the growth rate after period 1+t  is given by 0g  (not Bg ) in the economy 
with the TNB, the dynamics of such an economy can be described as 
(37)    1+tN ＝ Bg tN  
1++stN ＝ 0g stN +  （ 1≥s ） 
Regarding the welfare index of each generation, the indirect utility of generation 1−t  
is the same as that in the previous section and therefore is given by (23). It is not the 
case for generation t , because their consumption plans in this case are 
(38)  ytc ＝ tNβ
φ ,  otc 1+ ＝ 11 ++ tt NQ ＝ )( ηπ + Bg tN  
Here, notice that old period consumption in this case ( otc 1+ ＝ )( ηπ + Bg tN ) is different 
form that in the economy with the CNB ( otc 1+ ＝ )( B−+ηπ Bg tN ). This is because in 
this case the equilibrium condition of the R&D sector at period 1+t  is given by (28), 





(39)  tU ＝ )log( tNβ
φ
＋ ])log[( tB Ngηπβ +  
Finally, since the consumption plans of generation st +  are given by  
(40)  y stc + ＝ B
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stc 1++ ＝ tB
s Ngg ))(( 0ηπ + , 
thier indirect utility function is 










0 )(log ＋ ]))(log[( 0 tB
s Nggηπβ +  
From (23), (39) and (41) we can easily confirm that an unexpected permanent increase 
in the TNB improves the utilities of generation t  and generation st +  while it harms 
the welfare of generation 1−t . In other words, unlike the case of the CNS in the 
previous subsection the welfare of all generations after generation t  is certainly 
improved in this case. This is because the equilibrium condition of the R&D sector after 
period 1+t  is given by (28) in this case and accordingly the stock price (Q ) does not 
decline after that period even when an increase in the initial bubble occurs.  
  Finally, we argue how large is the social benefit (or cost) of the TNB. From (23), (39) 
and (41) we calculate derive the social welfare level of the economy with TNB as 
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In the case where the utilities of all generations are evaluated almost equally (namely 
the case of δ ≒1), the tax rate reduces to 
(44)  τ ≒0 
Thus we have 
 
Proposition 2: If the utilities of all generations are evaluated almost equally, the social 
welfare level of the economy with the TNB is equal to that of the bubbleless economy. 
 





whether it is the CNS or the TNS, at least does not harm the social welfare, and in the 
case of the CNS the social welfare is improved by the generation of such a bubble. This 
result is quite contrasting with that of a pure bubble. Based on the Grossman and 
Yaganawa (1993) model which formulate a pure bubble in endogenous growth models, 
Tanaka (2007) demonstrated that if the utilities of all generations are evaluated almost 
equally such type of the bubble brings about the social cost (not benefit) and its extent is  
equivalent to imposing the wage income tax whose rate is SB /  (where B  is the real 
quantity of bubble asset and S  is the total savings). This difference of the results is 
due to the fact that a stock price bubble considered in this paper can have the 
growth-enhancing property while a pure bubble does not.   
 
3.  The case of self-fulfilling bubble (SB) 
  In the previous section we showed that the non-self-fulfilling bubble do not worsen 
the social welfare. How is the case of the self-fulfilling bubble (SB)? When the bubble 
has the standard self-fulfilling property it grows over time by the same rate as the 
growth rate of the economy. Such an expansion of the bubble reduces the part of the 
national savings which is allocated to the R&D sector and tends to impede growth, 
which implies that the social welfare effect of the SB may be different from those of the 
non-self-fufilling bubbles. In this section we therefore construct a model with the SB 
and explore how large is the social benefit (or cost) of it.    
 
3.1 The model and its basic properties 
  As the model with SB has been already constructed by Tanaka (2008), we explain the 
structure of the model only briefly.  
  The formulation of the production sector is basically the same as that of the previous 
section, but a bubble which arises in the R&D sector does not collapse in the next period 
and continues to grow in the case of SB, so the bubbles arise on all the existing (old and 
new) firms in such an economy. We therefore need to add the explanation about the 
“aggregate bubble” as the sum of those bubbles and to clarify the relation between it 
and the initial bubble ( B ) that arises in the stock price of each newly created firm.   
  Consider a firm founded in period s . The market value of this firm’s stock at the 
beginning of period t  ( st ≥ ) is  
(45)     ),( tsV ＝ tQ ＋ ),( tsB   ( ],[ ts −∞∈ ). 
Generation t  purchases this stock from generation 1−t , receives the dividend tπ  
from the firm in the same period, and then sells it to generation 1+t  at the price 











the net return of holding this stock must be equal to 1+tr , the following holds: 







＝ 11 ++ tr . 
From (47) we have 
(47)     )1( 1++ tr ),( tsB ＝ )1,( +tsB    (for ],[ ts −∞∈∀ ). 
The market value of the total wealth ( tW ) at the beginning of period t  is defined as 





ss NNtsV ))(,( 1  
＝ tt NQ ＋
A







ss NNtsB ))(,( 1 ). 
We call this AtB  “the aggregate bubble”. From the definition of 
A
tB  we have  














ss NNtsB ))(1,( 1 ＋ ))(1,1( 1 tt NNttB −++ +   





ss NNtsB ))(,( 1 ＋ )1( 1++ tr B )( 1 tt NN −+   (by (10) and (17)) 
＝
A
tt Br )1( 1++ ＋ ))(1( 11 ttt NNrB −+ ++ . 
This reveals the dynamic motion of the aggregate bubble. 
  Regarding the formulation of household, the behavior of generation t  is the same as 
before, so their utility maximization problem and its solutions are given by (12) and (13) 
again. The behavior of the generation 1−t , on the other hand, is slightly modified to 
(50)  otc ＝ tW  
because in the case of SB the market value of the total wealth at the beginning of period 
t  is given by tW  (not tt NQ ) due to the existence of the stock price bubble. 
  Finally, the market equilibrium conditions in this case are basically the same as thoes 
in the previous section, but we have the derived equilibrium condition of final goods 
market, which corresponds to (19) in the previous section, as follows7. 
                                                   





t cc + ＋ txN ＋ )( 1 tt NN −+η  
⇔  Lwt ＋ tpxN ＝
y





(51)  ts ＝ tNB)( −η ＋
A
tB ＋ )( 1 tt NN −+η  
Considering that ts  is given by (20) as before, we can derive, from (49) and (51), the 
dynamic equations of this economy as 



















φ AtbB −+ , 
where Atb ≡ t
A
t NB / .  
  Tanaka (2008) demonstrated the followings in the bubble economy formulated above: 
・Firstly, if the condition about the initial bubble ( B ): 














sb  holds), and the former equilibrium (
A
ub ) is globally unstable while the 
latter ( Asb ) is globally stable. Further, the growth rate of the former equilibrium is lower 
than the latter (namely, uBg ＜
s
Bg ). 
・Secondly, as the growth rate of the bubbleless economy ( 0g ) is given by (22) as in the 
previous section, the difference between 0g  and Bg  is  
(54)  0g － Bg ＝ η/)( Bb
A −  








+ )1(  holds in the 
stationary state, so the the existence of the self-fulfilling bubble is harmful to growth.  
・Finally, depending on which stationary equilibrium the economy stays in, the grwoth 
                                                                                                                                                   
⇔  Lwt －
y
tc ＝ tW ＋ txNp )1( − ＋ )( 1 tt NN −+η  
⇔  (*)  ts ＝ tW － tNπ ＋ )( 1 tt NN −+η   (by (12) and (5)) 
Here, the following holds from (48), (16), and (17) 









ππ ＋ AtB ＝ tNB)]([ −+ ηπ ＋
A
tB  











and welfare effects of an unexpected permanent change in the initial bubble ( B ) are 












Regarding the intergenerational welfare effect, an unexpected permanent increase in 
B  at the beginning of period t  harms the welfare of current old (generation 1−t ) but 
improves the other generations in the unstable equilibrium while it improves the 
welfare of current generations but harms the welfare of future generations born 
sufficiently later in the stable equilibrium. Accordingly, the existence of the bubble is 
benefitial to some generations but not to other generations also in the case of SB, so 
measuring the social welfare effect of SB is interesting. 
 
3.2 The social welfare effect of SB 
  Finally, we calculate how large is the social benefit (or cost) of the existence of SB by 
the same way as in the previous section. The welfare index of each generation in this 
case is as follows. From (48), (50), (16) and (17) the indirect utility of generation 1−t  is 
(55)  1−tU ＝ ])log[( t
A
t NbB +−+ηπβ  
Considering the consumption plans of generation t  and generation st +  are given 
respectively by 
(56)     ytc ＝ tNβ
φ ,  otc 1+ ＝ 1+tW ＝ )(
AbB +−+ηπ tB Ng  





φ ,  o stc 1++ ＝ 1++stW ＝ )(
AbB +−+ηπ 1)( +sBg tN , 
we have the indirect utility function of each generations as 
(57)     tU ＝ )log( tNβ
φ
＋ ])log[( t
A NbB +−+ηπβ ＋ Bglogβ , 
  stU + ＝ )log( tNβ
φ
＋ ])log[( t
A NbB +−+ηπβ ＋ Bgss log)]1([ ++ β . 
So, the social welfare level of the economy with SB can be calculated as 














































⎡ −+ 1AbB  
In the case of δ ≒１, the tax rate reduces to  













gg B− （＞0） 
From (60) we can see that the existence of SB harms the socila welfare and its extent is 
equivalent to imposing to all generations the wage income tax whose rate is 
00 /)( ggg B−  (so, in the case of 0g ＝ 1.1 and Bg ＝ 1.05, for example, the 
corresponding tax rate is about 4.5％). Interestingly, this result is exactly opposite to the 
case of CNB (see Proposition 1), which means that the effects of the stock price bubble 
on social welfare are quite different depending on whether the bubble is self-fulfilling or 




Bg  holds. To summarize, we have:  
 
Proposition 3: If the utilities of all generations are evaluated almost equally, the 
existence of SB brings the social cost which is equivalent to imposing to all generations 
a wage income tax whose rate is 00 /)( ggg B− . 
 
4.  Conclusion 
  We investigated the social welfare effect of the stock price bubble. The stock price 
bubble considered in this paper, which was originally proposed by Olivier (2000), has 
the effect of stimulating the R&D activity and accelerating growth. Such a 
growth-enhancing effect is benefitial to future generations who can enjoy the 
accumulated stock of the variety of intermediate goods, so the type of bubble which has 
the larger growth-enhancing property can bring about the larger social welfare. In this 
paper we considered three types of bubble: continuous non-self-fulfilling bubble (CNB) 
which can stimulate growth most strongly, temporal non-self-fulfilling bubble (TNB) 
which does not stimulate growth as much as CNB does, and the self-fulfilling bubble the 
existence of which depresses growth, and demonstrated the followings: (ⅰ) CNB brings 
about the social benefit whose extent is equilvalent to subsidizing 00 /)( gggB −  (>0) 
rate of wage income to all generations, (ⅱ) the social welfare effect of TNB is “neutral” 
in the sense that the social welfare level of the economy with TNB is exactly equal to the 
bubbleless economy, and (ⅲ) the existence of SB harms the social welfare and its extent 
is is equilvalent to imposing to all generations a wage income tax whose rate is 











In this paper we investigated the welfare benefit (or cost) of bubble based on a simple 
endogenous growth model. As was shown by Saint-Paul (1992) under the framework of 
endogenous growth theory the problem of “over-accumulation of capital”, the stock price 
bubble which excessively allocates the national savings to the R&D sector does not 
necessarily causes the welfare loss through distorting dynamic resource allocation. In 
the context of the standard neoclassical growth model, however, the bubble which 
excessively spark capital accumulation may have the negative impact on social welfare. 
Examining how large is the social welfare cost of both pure bubble and stock price 
bubble is one of the questions for future research.  
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